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INTRODUCTION

Following his impressive survey of the principal common law areas,I
Richard Posner observed that the common law contained an implicit

*Professor of Economics, University of Florida. B.A., 1964; M.A., 1966; Ph.D., 1968, Michigan
State University.
**Economist, Antitrust Unit, Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida. B.A., 1988,
University of Florida.
The authors appreciate the financial support provided by the Department of Economics and
the Public Policy Research Center at the University of Florida. Helpful comments and encouragement were provided by Malcolm Burns, Jeffrey Harrison, Herbert Hovenkamp, and David
Kaserman. Nonetheless, we retain full responsibility for what follows.
1. That is, property, contracts, and torts.
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As a result, common law rules allocate responsibilities

to minimize the costs of social interaction, s which is to say that common
law rules are "efficient" in the economic sense. Posner explained this

startling outcome by noting that a judge's intuition and common sense
will compel considerations of efficient resource allocation. 4 This explanation was not particularly palatable to economists who are used to
outcomes being driven by the pursuit of individual self-interest 5 and
not by the insights of well-meaning judges.
Paul Rubin offered an alternative explanation that is considerably
more in keeping with economic logic.6 Rubin's evolutionary model
spawned a fascinating series of articles that has enhanced understanding of the common law's evolutionary process. 7 In essence, an inefficient rule involves unnecessarily high costs. Such a rule imposes deadweight welfare losses upon one of the parties to a dispute. As a result,
one party has more to gain than the other party has to lose by a
change from an inefficient rule to an efficient rule. Accordingly, litigation will occur until the precedent is changed and an efficient rule
emerges. 9 In contrast, an efficient rule will not be litigated because

2.
3.
4.

R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (1972).
Id.
Id. at 99. Posner states:
The character of common law litigation forces a confrontation with economic issues.
The typical common law case involves a dispute between two parties over which
one should bear a loss. In searching for a reasonably objective and impartial standard... the judge can hardly fail to consider whether the loss was the product of
wasteful, uneconomical resource use. In a culture of scarcity, this is an urgent, an
inescapable question. And at least an approximation to the answer is in most cases
reasonably accessible to intuition and common sense.

Id.
5. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Modern Libr. 1937) (5th ed. 1789) provides
the earliest observation that an "invisible hand" leads individuals pursuing their own self-interest
to promote the interests of society generally. In a complex society, Smith's invisible hand may
not operate satisfactorily. See Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure,72 Q.J. ECON. 351 (1958).
6. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
7. See Blume & Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 405
(1982); Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 393 (1978); Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent
and Rules, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986); Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Priest, Selective Characteristicsof Litigatian, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD. 65 (1977) [hereinafter Selection of Effwient Rules].
8. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1717
(1982) (expressing some doubt that the principal common law doctrines decisively influence the
flow of scarce resources in a market economy).
9. See infra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
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no deadweight loss exists and, therefore, the disfavored party has
less to gain than the favored party has to lose. Consequently, settlements emerge and the rule of law does not change. Thus, one prediction
of this theory is that inefficient rules will be litigated while efficient
rules will lead to out-of-court settlementslo
In his remarkable survey of antitrust law in the United States,
Robert Bork found inefficient rules in nearly every area of the law.,,
Accordingly, antitrust should be a fertile ground for applying the
evolutionary model of the common law.' Since we have antitrust statutes, one may object that the statutory language controls the results
rather than any evolutionary process. These statutes, however, contain
vague prohibitions that require judicial interpretation in the common
law tradition.iI Consequently, the predictions of the evolutionary model
ought to be valid for antitrust rules. To illustrate this, the article
examines the economically efficient rule against price fixing among
horizontal competitors 4 and the economically inefficient rule prohibiting the imposition of maximum resale prices. 15 Then, the article examines the pattern of litigation and finds that the efficient rule is litigated
far more often than the inefficient rule. Since this is inconsistent with
predictions of the evolutionary model, some explanations for this result
are offered.
II.

EVOLUTION OF COMMON LAW EFFICIENCY

The basic driving force behind the evolution of efficient common
law rules flows from the pursuit of individual self interest. This may
be demonstrated through an example that will provide the analytical
foundation for the subsequent analysis of antitrust rules.16 Suppose
that an accident has occurred in which A has injured B. The harm

10. On settlements generally, see Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 279 (1973). See also Priest & Klein, supra note 7.
11. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
12.

Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982) (contends that

one should not expect antitrust rules to be efficient, but we shall argue that this is not correct).
See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
13.
14.

See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (140) (court established per

se rule against price fixing agreements).
15. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). The Albrecht rule has been examined in
some detail and found wanting. See, e.g., Blair & Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing and the
Goals of Antitrust, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 43 (1986); Blair & Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule
and Consumer Welfare: An Economic Analysis, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 461 (1981); Easterbrook,
Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CI. L. REv. 886 (1981).

16. This example is drawn from Rubin, supra note 6, with a change in notation.
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caused by the accident can be represented by H. If the law places
the liability for accidents on A, then A will have an incentive to spend
some amount, which we denote by CA on accident avoidance. 17 A
certain number of accidents will occur despite A's incurring costs of
CA because it is usually not optimal to reduce the number of accidents
to zero. 8 Given A's expenditure of CA on accident avoidance, the
number of accidents that will occur anyway is denoted by NA. In
contrast, if the legal rule imposed liability upon B, then B would incur
accident avoidance costs of CB, which may be vastly different from
those incurred by A,' 9 and NB accidents nevertheless would occur. 20
In this setting, an efficient legal rule is one that minimizes the
total costs associated with potential accidents. If the present value
(PV) of the accident avoidance costs incurred by B plus the accident
costs that occur anyway 2' is less than that for A, that is, if
PV(CB + NBH) < PV(CA + NAH),

then liability should be placed on B because B is the lowest cost party.
Suppose that B is the most efficient accident avoider, but an inefficient legal rule assigns liability to A rather than to B. This will lead
A to incur accident avoidance costs of CA and NA accidents will occur.

Assuming that both A and B know about the legal rule, and A is

17. If A is risk neutral, then A will incur accident avoidance costs up to the point where
the marginal benefit of further accident avoidance, measured by the expected reduction in
accident claims, is equal to the additional expenditure on accident avoidance.
18. For example, suppose that the harm (H) if an accident occurs is $100,000. Suppose
further that, given current levels of accident avoidance costs (CA), the probability that an
accident will occur is 1%. With no further expenditure for accident avoidance, the expected
accident claims are (0.01)($100,000) = $1,000. No risk neutral decisionmaker will spend more
than $1,000 for additional accident avoidance under these circumstances. But reducing the probability of an accident to zero is often excessively expensive; thus, it is optimal for some accidents
to occur.
19. For example, if automobile drivers were always liable in an accident with a pedestrian,
the accident avoidance costs would be far different than those incurred by pedestrians if the
rule of liability were reversed.
20. Considerations similar to those sketched in supra note 19 dictate that the optimal
number of accidents depends upon the rule of liability.
21. The present value of a flow of costs over time is given by the following formula:
T
PV(COSTS) = . (COST)/(1 + i)y
t=
1
T
where T is the number of time periods, i is the discount rate, and Z denotes summation.
t= 1
See, e.g., J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 66-92 (7th ed. 1981).
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concerned about the precedent for future cases, as well as the instant
case, there will be an incentive to litigate.2
When an accident occurs, A and B must decide whether to settle
or to litigate. If they go to court and A wins, A does not pay H to
B and A stops incurring the accident avoidance costs of CA since
precedent now favors A. At the same time, B will begin incurring
accident avoidance costs of CB. If B wins, B receives H and A continues
incurring CA since precedent continues to favor B. Letting the costs
of litigation for A and B be TA and TB, respectively, and using P to
designate the probability of B's winning,23 the expected value of litigation to A is2
E[L]A = -P(H) + (1-P)(PV(CA + NAH)) - TA

while the expected value to B is
E[L]B = P(H) + (1-P)(-PV(CB + NBH)) - TB

If, on balance, the expected value of litigation is positive, that is, if
E[L]A + E[LIB > 0,

then the parties will litigate rather than settle. If the expected value
of the litigation is not positive, then the parties will reach an out-of23
court settlement. In our example, litigation will occur provided that
(l-P)[PV(CA + NAH) - PV(CB + NBH)] > TA + TB

The greater the inefficiency, as measured by the difference between
the present value of the costs, the more likely the litigation. The
stronger the precedent is, the smaller (1-P) will be, and the less likely

22. Many individuals have little interest in legal rules beyond the present case. When A
and B are corporations, such as insurance companies or labor unions, they may be interested

in the present case for its own sake and for the impact that it has on precedent.
23.

We assume that there are only two outcomes: A wins or B wins. The probability of

B's winning measures the relative frequency of B's winning. The sum of probabilities must
always add up to one. Thus, if P is the probability of B's winning, then 1-P is the probability
of A's winning. See, e.g., E. PARZEN, MODERN PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS
17-28 (1960).
24. The notation E[e], adopted from the mathematical statistics literature, means the expected value of whatever is in the brackets.

25. This expression follows algebraically from the inequality
EIVIA + EMB > 0.
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the parties are to litigate.26 Finally, as the costs of litigation rise,
settlement becomes more likely.
In summary, an inefficient rule is likely to be litigated when the
precedent assigning liability to the highest cost party is not too strong,
the inefficiency is substantial in monetary terms,- and the costs of
litigation are not too high. The fact that a certain issue is continually
relitigated means that judges are continually facing opportunities to
change the precedent. When some judges rule in favor of A, precedent
will begin to change in favor of A. The legal rule will become efficient
and the issue will no longer be litigated because the expected gains
to litigation are too small.
Following Rubin's initial insight, several useful extensions and refinements have furthered understanding of the common law's evolutionary tendency toward efficient rules. George Priests argues that
inefficient rules impose greater costs on those subject to them and
thereby increase the stakes of the dispute over those that would exist
with efficient rules. Since the stakes are higher, there is a greater
likelihood that inefficient rules will lead to litigation simply because
the expected returns to litigation are higher. Thus, inefficient rules
are more likely to be reviewed. In other words, the set of cases
available for judicial review will contain a disproportionately large
number of inefficient rules. Those rules that are not contested will be
predominantly efficient. When it is primarily inefficient rules that are
litigated, there will be a tendency toward efficiency in the set of all
rules.2 Priest finds that
[e]fficient rules "survive" in an evolutionary sense because
they are less likely to be relitigated and thus less likely to
be changed, regardless of the method of decision. Inefficient
rules "perish" because they are more likely to be reviewed
and review implies the chance of change whatever the
method of judicial decision3

26.

Priest & Klein, supra note 7, at 17-24 (arguing persuasively that litigation occurs most

frequently when P and (1-P) are closer to one half. This is because each side has a good chance

of winning).
27.

If the rule were efficient, the condition for litigation would never be satisfied. Thus,

there would be no litigation.
28. Selection of Efficient Rules, supra note 7, at 65. In an addendum to his paper, Rubin
offers a critique of Priest's contribution. Rubin, supra note 6, at 62-63.

29. Selection of Efficient Rules, supra note 7, at 68-69. Priest shows that even if the
judiciary decides the outcome randomly, as by flipping a coin, efficiency will emerge over time
due to the opportunity set of cases that the judiciary considers. Id. at 68-69.
30. Id. at 72.
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Thus, Priest's analysis suggests that the common law process incorporates a strong tendency toward efficient outcomes.
In Rubin's analysis, the probability of one party's winning was
purely a function of precedent. John Goodman changed the analysis
by making the probability of one party's winning a function of precedent and the legal expenses incurred by both parties.3 1 In particular,
he assumed that any increment in legal expenses incurred by a party
in a legal dispute will lead to some increment in that party's probability
of winning a favorable decision.a Furthermore, he reasoned that the
party with the greater economic stake in the decision will have more
incentive to influence the outcome through additional legal costs and,
therefore, will enjoy a higher probability of winning. Even if the
existing precedent favors an inefficient solution, the inefficiency will
impose sufficient costs upon the disadvantaged party such that over
time a series of reversals will lead to an efficient precedent.3
The evolutionary models of the common law process rely upon the
litigation of inefficient rules by parties interested in precedent. Movements toward efficiency are not advanced by the wisdom of common
law judges,35 but by private decisions to litigate. Rubin has observed
that similar forces influence statutory law'3 since special interest
groups may invest in lobbying efforts that are designed to influence
legislation. The next section examines the antitrust statutes and their
common law characteristics.
III. ANTITRUST AS COMMV1ON LAW
Our fundamental antitrust statute is the Sherman Act of 1890. 37
While one may suppose that the statutory language sets out clearly
31. Goodman, supra note 7, at 393. Goodman relied upon game theory in his analysis. On
the mathematical theory of games, see J. FRIEDMAN, GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS
TO

ECONOMICS (1986); R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES

AND

DECISIONS (1957); M. SHUBiK,

GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1982).

32. Goodman, supra note 7, at 393.
33. Id.
34. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 405, analyze the dynamically efficient path that
the evolution to statistically efficient legal rules should follow. In essence, they examine the
trade-off between stare decisis and a system involving rapid precedential changes. For some
remarkable insights regarding the consequences of change, see Kaplow, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv. 509 (1986).
35. Priest & Klein, supra note 7, at 1. Priest has shown that efficiency will emerge even
where the judicial decision process is random. See also Goodman, supranote 7, at 393 (Goodman's
model can be used to incorporate judicial bias).
36. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982). For an earlier
observation that this is the case, see G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL (1980).

37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1984).
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what types of business behavior are permissible this is not the case.
For example, section 1 provides in relevant part that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." This is a vague and general principle
that private efforts to eliminate competition are prohibited 9 But the
statute contains no definition of what constitutes a restraint of trade.
Moreover, that term did not have a universally understood meaning
in 1890. It is, in fact, a legal term of art that obtained its current
meaning through a series of judicial decisions. 40 The Sherman Act thus
provided a statutory foundation upon which the judiciary could develop
41
a federal common law of trade restraints.

From its enactment, commentators have criticized the Sherman
Act for its vague language, elusive meaning, and ambiguous charges.
Although its language incorporated terms like "restraint of trade,"
which were known to the common law, Congress did not simply codify
the common law.- The use of common law terms and references imposed a new jurisdiction upon the federal courts.43 In essence, the
Sherman Act was little more than a legislative command to the
judiciary to develop a federal common law of business practices as
they relate to competition. According to Herbert Hovenkamp, "the
Sherman Act can be regarded as 'enabling' legislation - an invitation
to the federal courts to learn how business and markets work and
formulate a set of rules that will make them work in socially efficient
ways." 4" Thus, the federal common law courts would proceed as all
common law courts proceed. They would employ the usual techniques
of judicial reasoning, consider that reasoning along with decisions of
other courts, and participate in the evolution of the law in the dynamic
common law tradition. 5
38.
39.

Id. § 1.
W. LETWIN, LAW

AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 3 (1965).
40. A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 22 (3d ed. 1980).
41. For the most recent criticism of judicial activism, see Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of
Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1986).
42. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 228-29 (1954) (believing the Sherman
Act was meant to be a federal codification of the common law of England and the several states).
Congress recognized, however, that the common law contained some ambiguities, which would
become clearer with subsequent decisions. Id.
43. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 49 (3 ed. 1981).
44. H. HOVENKAmp, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 52 (1985).
45. P. AREEDA, supra note 43, at 50. See also H. THORELL, supra note 42, at 228-29.
Thorelli states that "in adopting the standard of the common law Congress expected the courts
not only to apply a set of somewhat vague doctrines but also in doing so to make use of that
'certain technique of judicial reasoning' characteristic of common law courts." Id. at 228.
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Although one often finds an obligatory reference to the common
law antecedents of the Sherman Act, Hovenkamp points out that "[tihe
common law may continue to guide antitrust decisionmaldng, but in
most cases the evidence is hard to find. '46 He goes on to explain that
when one refers to the common law nature of antitrust, this usually
"refers to the power of the courts to devise specific rules that interpret
a broadly worded statute. The phrase is not generally used to suggest
that federal antitrust law today follows the common law of restraints
'47
on trade.
Since the content of the antitrust law is subject to common law
interpretation and development, one should be able to test the evolutionary model of the common law by observing certain rules that have
developed. The next two sections examine the evolution of two antitrust rules: horizontal price fixing and vertical maximum resale price
fixing. Both practices are per se illegal, but one is efficient while the
other is inefficient.

IV.

PRICE FIXING AMONG HORIZONTAL COMPETITORS

From the beginning, the Supreme Court has held that price fixing
is precisely the kind of restraint of trade that the Sherman Act was
designed to prevent.4 There have been a few diversions along the
way, 49 but the central thrust of the case law has been to make price
fixing a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The earliest cases grappled with the lack of legislative guidance.
For example, Justice Peckham's Trans-Missouri decision barred all
restraints of trade. A group of eighteen railroads formed the TransMissouri Freight Association for the purpose of establishing and maintaining reasonable rates, rules, and regulations on all freight traffic. 51
The agreement covered all traffic subject to competition between any
two or more members. 2 The Association decided that rate changes

46. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 214 (1985).
47. Id. at 214 n.7. See also Ekelund & Tolison, Economic Regulation in Mercantile England: Heckscher Revisited, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 567 (1980) ("Monopoly founded on custom or by
Parliament was held to be legitimate under the common law, while monopoly founded by royal
grant was not.").
48. A remarkable survey of the law and economics is provided by Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE
L.J. 373 (1966) (this two-part article is valuable reading).
49. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
50. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
51. Id. at 292.
52. Id. at 293.
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normally should be agreed upon at a monthly meeting.53 In between
meetings, independent rate cuts were permissible as necessary for
"meeting competition."' The defendants argued that the collusive rates
were reasonable and necessary to avoid ruinous competition.r Justice
Peckham rejected both the reasonable rate argument6 and the ruinous
competition argument. 7 Then he turned to the literal wording of section 1 and held that there were no exceptions: all restraints of trade
violated the Act.5
The following year, Justice Peckham faced a remarkably similar
fact situation 9 In this case, however, he clearly articulated that not
all restraints of trade are illegal.ro He found that only those restraints
whose direct and immediate effect is to restrain interstate commerce
are banned by the Sherman Act.61 This, of course, applied to the
railroads' price fixing agreement.
In Addyston Pipe & Steel, Judge Taft applied and refined Justice
Peckham's reasoning.6 The manufacturers of cast iron soil pipe in one
section of the country formed an association to reduce competition
among their members. One important element of their scheme was
to assign certain cities to specified producers. 4 Another important
facet of the scheme was bid rigging, which is a variant of price flxing.6
For business outside the allocated cities, the association selected the
price to be charged to the customer.r Production responsibility was
assigned to the association member that was willing to pay the largest
amount into a bonus pool.6 This bonus pool was then divided among

53.
54.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
formed

60.

Id. at 294.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 327-30.
Id. at 330-33.
Id. at 340.
United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (thirty-one railroad companies
an association agreeing to fix and modify established rates).

Id. at 560-62. Restraints that are necessary to promote business are not illegal. The

distinction involves ancillary restraints that are generally permissible under the common law.
For an interesting examination, see Bork, AncillaryRestraintsand the Sherman Act, 15 A.B.A.
SEc. ANTITRUST L. PROC. 211 (1959).
61. 171 U.S. at 577.
62. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
63. 85 F. at 273.

64.

Id.

65.
66.
67.

Id. at 274.
Id.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss2/3
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the members according to each firm's proportion of total productive
capacity.6 The winner would submit a bid equal to that selected by
the association and the other firms would submit higher bids.6
The association offered several defenses. First, they argued that
their intention was not to charge unreasonable prices, but to avoid
ruinous competition.70 Since ruinous competition injures the public,
contracts to check ruinous competition should not be deemed illegal.7
Judge Taft was unpersuaded that the courts should try to determine
how much restraint should be tolerated to protect against ruinous
competition.7,2 Second, the defendants argued that the contributions
to the bonus pool were deductions from reasonable prices to prevent
each member from being too greedy.7 The logic of this argument is
not entirely clear but presumably it was a serious contention. Third,
the fixed prices were not only reasonable, but they were also subject
to competition from outsiders. 4 Finally, the association was not a
monopoly since it involved only about thirty percent of the national
capacity2 These arguments were designed to support the contention
that the association lacked the power to fix prices, but Judge Taft
quickly disposed of this disingenuous assertion. Taft finally ruled
against the association's restraints.76
The rule against price fixing acquired more specificity in the Trenton Potteries7 case, which involved twenty-three producers of vitreous
pottery fixtures for bathrooms. These production firms accounted for
over eighty percent of that business in the United States."8 The defendants admitted they had combined to fix prices.7 9 The issue was

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 283-84. The court stated:
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts .
have set sail on a
sea of doubt, and have assumed the power to say, in respect to contracts which
have no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual
restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public interest,
and how much is not.

Id.
73. Id. at 284.
74. Id. at 291.
75. Id. at 291-92.
76. Id. at 292. "rhe most cogent evidence that they had this power is the fact, everywhere
apparent in the record that they exercised it." Id.
77. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
78. Id. at 394.
79. Id.
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whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that "if it found
the agreements or combinations complained of, it might return a verdict of guilty without regard to the reasonableness of the prices fixed."
The Supreme Court took this opportunity to clarify its view on price
fixing agreements:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The power
to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves
power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may
through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be
maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition
secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed.
Agreements which create such potential power may well be
held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints,
without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular
price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed .... so
Thus, price fixing clearly became a per se violation of the Sherman
Act without proof of economic effect. Price fixing as a business practice
was deemed an inherently unreasonable restraint of trade.
The Trenton Potteries court's hostility toward price fixing [as a
business practice] was reiterated, clarified, and extended by Justice
Douglas in his Socony-Vacuum81 decision, which is the controlling case
today. During the 1920s and 1930s, so-called "hot oil" and "hot
gasoline," that is oil and gasoline produced in violation of state prorationing laws, were sold at prices substantially below the prices of
legally produced oil and gasoline. 2 In addition, there seemed to be
considerable quantities of "distress" gasoline on the spot market. 3 The
distress gasoline was due to the inadequate storage facilities of independent refiners who could not sell all of their output through normal
outlets. Distress sales, of course, were made at substantially reduced
prices on the spot market."
The major oil companies were vitally interested in spot market
prices because their contracts with jobbers involved formula prices

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 397.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that depended on the spot market price6 Alarmed at the deterioration
in spot market prices, the major oil companies formed a Tank Car
Stabilization Committee to deal with the problem. 7 The Committee's
plan had each major oil company select one or more of the independent
refiners with distress gasoline as its "dancing partner." Each major
company was responsible for buying the distress supply of its dancing
partner. 9 By eliminating the distress supply from the spot market,
the spot price was higher than otherwise would have been the case
and, therefore, the prices paid by jobbers to the major oil companies
were also higher.9 Thus, by acting collusively to purchase a very
small portion of the total supply, the majors had a substantial effect
on their total sales revenue.9 1
Justice Douglas reviewed the Supreme Court decisions dealing with
section 1 and found no relief for the major oil companies:
Thus for over forty years this Court has consistently and
without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing
agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and
that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which
those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate
may be interposed as a defense ....

The issue then turned to whether the per se rule of Trenton Potteries
applied to Socony-Vacuum. In Socony-Vacuum, the major oil companies had not agreed on uniform and inflexible prices as was the case
in Trenton Potteries. The oil companies argued that price fixing was
illegal per se only where the conspirators set uniform and inflexible
prices.9 3 Douglas disposed of this distinction as irrelevant. Since the
program had the purpose and effect of raising prices, it was a violation
of section 1.
Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity. Congress has not left with us
the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing
schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has

86. Id. at 166.
87. Id. at 178.
88.

Id. at 179.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 218.
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not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous competition and
competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing conspiracies.
It has no more allowed genuine or fancied competitive abuses
as a legal justification for such schemes than it has the good
intentions of the members of the combination.94
To add even further clarity, Douglas wrote: "Under the Sherman Act
a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."95 This remains the
rule of law. Every case that involves a question of price fixing cites
or quotes Justice Douglas's Socony-Vacuum opinion with obvious approval.
A. Economic Evaluation of the Price Fixing Rule
Horizontal price fixing is thus illegal per se. This is an economically
efficient rule. Figure 1, which compares the competitive price and
output with the collusive price and output, shows the rule's efficiency.
Consumer demand for the product in question is represented by the
negatively sloped line labeled D. Assuming the industry is small compared to the size of the input markets, industry adjustments in output
will leave the input prices unaffected. Consequently, the entry and
exit of separate profit-seeking firms will yield a horizontal long-run
supply function, like the one shown in Figure 1 as LRS. Competition
leads to the production and sale of Qc units of output, which will be
sold for the competitive price of Pc. The sales revenue (Pc - Qc) will
be just large enough to cover all of the costs of producing and distributing Qc units of output, including a normal return on the investment
in each competitive firm. Furthermore, price is such that any consumer
who is willing to pay the cost to society of an additional unit of output
can buy that extra output. Those who value the product more than
the competitive price enjoy consumer surplus.9 In Figure 1, the triangular area ABCPc represents the consumer surplus associated with
the competitive price and output.97

94.

Id. at 221.

95.
96.

Id. at 223.
The concept of consumer surplus can be traced to DUPUIT, On the Measurement of the

Utility of Public Works (1844), translated and reprinted in READINGS IN WELFARE
ECONOMICS 255-83 (Y. Arrow & T. Scitovsky 1969).

97. This measure is a reasonable approximation of the theoretically correct measure of
consumer surplus lost. See Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REV.
589 (1976).
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FIGURE 1

Price and Cost

LRS=MC

D

c

Quantity

These results may be contrasted with those that flow from price
fixing. If the formerly competitive firms agree to refrain from price
competition, they can benefit themselves. If the firms are sufficiently
cooperative, the colluders may select the joint profit maximizing price
and thereby collectively behave like a monopolist.9 In Figure 1, this
requires producing output QM, where marginal revenue equals marginal cost9 and pricing that output at PM. The colluders will experience
a profit equal to the rectangular area PmBEPc. Those consumers who
continue to buy the product will enjoy consumer surplus equal to the
triangular area ABPM. The sum of consumer surplus and producers'
profits, areas ABPM and PMBEPc, is less than the consumer surplus
associated with competitive pricing. Those consumers distributed along
98.

For a detailed theoretical examination of price fixing, see R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN,

ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 132-53 (1985).

99. For the group of formerly competitive firms, the long run supply (LRS) now serves as
the marginal cost curve.
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the demand curve between B and C are willing to pay more than the
cost to society of producing those units of output between QM and
Qc. But the colluding firms refuse to produce those units of output.
They will only produce QM because that is the output that maximizes
their profit.
An interesting result has occurred here. In order to transfer consumer surplus of PMBEPc from consumers to the producers, consumer
surplus is reduced by PMBEPc plus the triangle BCE. The latter area
has been termed a deadweight social welfare loss.,,* Thus, horizontal
price fixing is inefficient in the sense that social welfare is reduced,
that is, consumers lose more than the price fixers gain. Accordingly,
an antitrust rule that prohibits price fixing will tend 10to prevent these
reductions in social welfare. Such a rule is efficient. '
B.

Litigation v. Settlement of Horizontal Price Fixing Cases

Following the literature on evolutionary models, 02 one may examine the condition that will determine whether a horizontal price fixing
case will be litigated or settled. Section 4 of the Clayton Act'03 provides
that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
• . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit . . . ." For the consumers who have been victimized
by price fixing, the Supreme Court has decided that they fall within
the protection of section 4. 104Therefore, the victimized consumers are
entitled to sue for three times the overcharge plus their attorney
fees. 105

100. The welfare loss triangle is developed from a famous article by Hotelling, The General
Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938).
101. Even the most ardent critics of antitrust policy generally approve of the rule against
price fixing. See R. BORK, supranote 11, at 263-79; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 8-22 (1976).
102. See supra notes 6-7.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1984).
104. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337-45 (1979), an individual sought treble
damages from five manufacturers of hearing aids. They argued that the "business or property"
language in § 4 refers to "business activity or property related to one's business." Id. at 330.
The Supreme Court rejected this strained construction and ruled that "[a] consumer not engaged
in a 'business' enterprise, but rather acquiring goods or services for personal use, is injured in
'property' when the price of those goods or services is artificially inflated by reason of the
anticompetitive conduct complained of." Id. at 339.
105. As Figure 1 shows, the effect of the price fixing is to raise price from the competitive
level (Pc) to the monopoly level (PM). Thus, the injury to the consumer's property is measured
by the overcharge (PM - PG) on the items sold.
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For a victim of the price fixing conspiracy, the expected value of
litigation, E[L]c will be equal to the probability of their winning times
treble damages plus the present value of the overcharges that presumably will not occur in the future minus the expected costs of litigation.
In the formula
E[L]c = P[3(0/C) + PV(O/C)] - (1-P) (Cc)
P denotes the probability of winning the case in court, (1-P) is the
probability of losing, O/C represents the total overcharge due to collusive pricing, PV(.) designates present value, and Cc represents the
cost of litigation to the consumer.
The price conspirators who have been illegally overcharging their
customers have an expected value of litigation, E[L]p, equal to the
probability of their losing times the treble damages that they will
have to pay, the present value of the overcharges that they will no
longer be able to collect, and the consumers' litigation costs plus the
probability of their winning times the present value of the future
overcharges minus their costs of litigation.
E[L]p = -P[3(0/C) + PV(O/C) + Cc] + (-P) [PV(O/C] - Cp
where Cp represents the producers' costs of litigation.
Litigation will occur if the sum of the expected values of litigation
is positive, that is, if
E[L]c + E[L]p > 0.
If this is not true, then the parties will settle rather than litigate. In
that case, the expected cost to the price fixers exceeds the expected
gain to the victims.10 In notational form, settlement will occur if -E[L]p
> E[L]c, that is, if
P[3(0/C) + PV(O/C) + Cc] - (1-P) [PV(O/C)] + Cp >
P[3(0/C) + PV(O/C)] - (1-P)Cc
Algebraic rearrangement yields the following simplified condition for
settlement:
(1-P)[PV(O/C)] < Cc + Cp
That is, if the probability of the price fixers' winning times the present
value of future overcharges is less than the total private costs of

106.

Rubin, supra note 6, at 54.
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litigation, 107 then the case will be settled. If this inequality is reversed,
litigating to change the precedent will be profitable.
The more firmly entrenched the existing precedent is in favoring
the victims, the larger the probability of their prevailing at trial, and
the smaller the probability of litigation. This follows from the fact
that as P increases (1-P) necessarily decreases. The costs of litigation
also come into play: the greater the costs of litigation, the more likely
settlement will occur.les In the case of horizontal price fixing, the per
se rule suggests that P is much larger than 0.5 and, in fact, approaches
1.0. As a result, the left side of the inequality is very small and little
litigation should ensue. 1°9
C.

Alternatives to Horizontal Price Fixing

In a classic price fixing cartel, the ostensible competitors agree on
a common price to charge. They also agree on the quantities that each
is to produce, and other terms of exchange such as delivery terms,
credit terms, and product quality.
There are, however, alternative means to the same or similar noncompetitive end. Given the sound social reason for judicial hostility
toward horizontal price fixing, it is of some interest to see how economically equivalent business practices are handled. For the most part,
they receive the same harsh treatment as price fixing.
In competitive bids for business, bid rigging involves an agreement
on which firm will win. The agreed upon losers submit bids above
that submitted by the winner. This obviously is an effort to avoid
competition with the result that prices will be higher. Thus, bid rigging
is closely related to price fixing and constitutes a per se violation of
section 1.110

107. The private costs do not include society's expenditure on resources to provide a judicial
system.
108. Salop & White, Treble Damages Reform: Implications of the Georgetown Project, 55
ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 76 (1986). Reports that "attorney's fees for both sides in the typical case
averaged in the range of $200,000 to $280,000." Id.
109. This is not to say that one should not expect much price fixing. If the deterrent effect
of the antitrust law and the associated penalties are not strong enough, one would expect price
fixing to be a common occurrence. Once discovered, however, the resulting suit should be
resolved without litigation if (1-P) is sufficiently close to zero. For analysis of the deterrent
effects of antitrust penalties, see Blair, A Suggestionfor Improved Antitrust Enforcement, 30
ANTITRUST BULL. 433 (1985) (analysis of the deterrent effects of antitrust penalties).
110. The prohibition against bid rigging can be traced to the decision in National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (collaboration to avoid competitive
bidding is also illegal); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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One of the problems confronting a price fixing cartel involves cheating:"' a cartel member may try to get even more profit by expanding
its output beyond its quota. This will require a price reduction in
order to sell the higher volume."2 One cheater will do little damage
to the agreement, but each firm has an incentive to cheat, which
undermines the stability of the cartel. One way of avoiding this problem is to share the markets on a geographic basis. In general, this
will not lead to quite as much total profit because the territorial assignments cannot be designed as precisely as quotas assigned to cartel
members. It does, however, create a series of monopolies in the assigned territories,13 thereby eliminating any incentive to cheat by
reducing price. Clearly, this will lead to monopoly prices as depicted
in Figure 1. Thus, market division can be a very good substitute for
4
price fixing. This practice also invokes judicial hostility.1
Putative competitors sometimes agree on terms that amount to
indirect price increases. For example, a group of rival firms may agree
to withdraw the extension of free credit for thirty days. Since the
monetary value of interest-free credit is obvious, its removal amounts
to a price increase. When the decision to remove interest-free credit
is not unilateral it violates the antitrust laws." s Similarly, an agreement to reduce the quality of a product without a corresponding price
reduction amounts to a price increase. This, too, is illegal.116 Finally,
information exchanges may have an undesirable side effect on price
levels. Accordingly, such exchanges violate section 1."1

111. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 98, at 141-45.
112. This assumes that the demand curve has a negative slope and thus requires a price
reduction to increase the quantity sold.
113. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 98, at 165-69.
114. Antecedents for the current hostility can be found in Addyston Pipe & Steel, 175 U.S.
at 211. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) and Timken Roller Beariig Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), both display continued suspicion of market division where
price is apt to be influenced. Finally, United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972),
ruled that market division even without substantial market power or some evidence of price
fixing was illegal per se. For a critique of Sealy and Topco, see R. BORK, supra note 11, at 270-79.
115. Catalano v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
116. National Macaroni Mfr's Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
Agreements on price that are allegedly necessary to protect against quality deterioration are
questionable. For example, the use of minimum fee schedules by professionals prevents price
competition below the minimum. Although it has been claimed that fees below the minimum
may impair quality, such agreements are illegal. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773

(1976).
117. The hostility to information exchanges is traceable to American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 357 U.S. 377 (1921). More recent decisions confirming this attitude are
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A boycott or concerted refusal to deal removes some rivals from

the competitive fray. A boycott reduces supply and causes prices to
increase." s When the purpose and effect of a boycott is to raise prices

above the competitive level, it is illegal per se. 19
Congress provided a vague, statutory prohibition of restraints of
trade in section 1 of the Sherman Act. Early decisions established the

per se illegality of price fixing. Given the unambiguous prohibition of
price fixing, subsequent litigation has not focused on efforts to change
this rule. Litigation has instead involved questions of characterizing

other business practices that amount to price fixing in purpose and

effectAm The antitrust law has evolved in the common law tradition
and identified various business practices that should be proscribed due
to their influence on prices.' 21
V.

MAXIMUM RESALE PRICE FIXING

The Supreme Court's treatment of maximum resale price fixing is

rather brief and not particularly insightful. The earliest mention of
provided by United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); United States
v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). For an interesting critique and analysis of the
antitrust treatment of information exchanges, see Posner, Antitrust and Information:Reflections
on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1979).
118. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 98, at 174-77 (analysis of impact of
boycotts on price).
119. See Kor's Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). See also R.
POSNER, supra note 101, at 207-10 (Judge Posner contends that boycotts are illegal per se when
used to enforce a business practice that violates substantive antitrust policy).
120. Some litigation, of course, involves the fact of price fixing. There are instances where
one may suspect that price fixing has occurred, but because of its clandestine nature no "smoking
gun" evidence exists. In such instances, litigation may be necessary to establish the fact of price
fixing.
121. The most serious failure in antitrust law evolution is the area of tacit agreements.
Some markets may involve so few rivals that "agreement" may be reached without any overt
communication. Tacit understandings are thought to be reached through signals. For an early
contribution, see E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 30-55 (8th
ed. 1962). See also Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 1562 (1969) (tacit agreements between competitors is within the reach of the antitrust
laws). But see Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962) (although such behavior is clearly
noncompetitive, it is nevertheless out of reach of the antitrust laws). There is a continuing or
renewed interest in this problem. For a sampling of the recent literature, see Clark, Price
Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of FacilitatingPracticesAfter Ethyl Corp.,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 887; Elzinga, New Developments on the CartelFront, 29 ANTITRUSr BULL.
3 (1984); Grether & Plott, The Effects of Market Practicesin OligopolisticMarkets: An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 479 (1984); Hay, Oligopoly, Shared
Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1982); Spence, Tacit Co-ordination
and Imperfect Information, 11 CANADIAN J. ECON. 490 (1978).
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fixing maximum prices is Socony-Vacuum, which was a horizontal
price fixing case. 2 In clarifying the Court's attitude toward cases that
have an impact upon price, Justice Douglas wrote "[uinder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."'' For over
ten years, the language regarding "depressing" prices remained nothing more than dictum. In 1951, however, the Supreme Court handed
down an important decision in the Kiefer-Stewart2 case.
Kiefer-Stewart was an Indiana firm that had a wholesale liquor
business.12 The defendants, Seagram and Calvert, were producers of
liquor that was sold to wholesalers in Indiana.2 6 Seagram and Calvert
agreed not to sell their products to any wholesaler that refused to
respect the maximum resale prices that they set.-7 Since KieferStewart refused to respect these maximum resale prices, it was denied
access to Seagram and Calvert products. 8 As a result, Kiefer-Stewart
was injured by lost profits on lost sales. 29 Seagram and Calvert claimed
that the decision to fix maximum resale prices was motivated by the
horizontal price fixing conspiracy among its wholesale customers and
presented evidence to support this contention. 130 In spite of this evidence, the Court ruled in favor of Kiefer-Stewart and explicitly reaffirmed the dictum in Socony-Vacuum on the grounds that agreements
to fix maximum resale prices "cripple the freedom of traders and
thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own
13
judgment.' 1
Following the logic developed in Kiefer-Stewart, the Court held a
maximum price fixing scheme to be illegal in its Albrecht decision.,Due to the special nature of the home delivery of newspapers, the
publisher of the Globe-Democrat,the Herald Company, assigned exclusive territories to its carriers."1 Within each exclusive territory, the

122.

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

123.

Id. at 223.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.

128. Id. at 213.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 214. 'The alleged illegal conduct of petitioner, however, could not legalize the

unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize them against liability to those they injured."
Id.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 213.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 147.
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assigned distributor had a monopoly on home delivery, which assured
that the costs incurred in providing home delivery service would be
minimized because duplicate effort was eliminated."34 In order to prevent each distributor from exploiting its monopoly power, the publisher
imposed maximum resale prices. 13 These delivery routes were subject
to termination if the carrier charged a price in excess of the price
advertised by the Globe-Democrat.136 Albrecht was one of the GlobeDemocrat's distributors and, although he was aware of the maximum
price policy, he ignored it and charged a higher price. 13 7 Following
the complaints of several customers, the publisher warned Albrecht
that he was jeopardizing his distributorship. m When Albrecht continued to overcharge his customers, the publisher took action against
him by first competing directly and later by substituting another distributor for part of Albrecht's territory.139 When Albrecht sued the
publisher and others for injuries suffered, the distributorship was
terminated and he was forced to sell it. 140

On appeal, the Supreme Court explicitly approved its earlier decision in Kiefer-Stewart, which, of course, defeated the Herald Company
as the Court found that "schemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the
conipetitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers
to compete and survive in that market.' 4' Although the Court was

aware that competitive forces may not operate in exclusive territories,
it ruled that fixing maximum prices violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.'4
A. Economic Evaluation of the Albrecht Rule
The rule of per se illegality for fixing maximum resale prices is
inefficient in an economic sense. To demonstrate this, consider Figure

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Albrecht sold his route for $12,000, which was $1,000 more than he had paid for it.
The substituted distributor, Kroner, sold his customers within Albrecht's territory for $3,600
to the party who had purchased Albrecht's route. Id. at 148 n.4.
141. Id. at 152.
142. Id. at 153. The majority found in favor of Albrecht in spite of a particularly cogent
dissent by Justice Harlan that spelled out the economic rationale for fixing maximum resale
prices. It is hard to believe today that Justice Harlan's logic was not persuasive. Id. at 156.
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FIGURE 2

Price and Cost
A
P1

-

MCp+MCD

d=MR-MCD

Quantity
2, which develops the motivation for maximum price fixing and reveals
the social and private costs of the Albrecht rule.'4 Maximum price
fixing usually arises when monopoly power is present at both the
production stage and the distribution stage.
Suppose that ABC, Inc. has a legal patent monopoly on the widget.
XYZ, Inc. distributes the widget for ABC. Assume that scale
economies in distribution are such that the market will only support
a single distributor. As a result, XYZ has a monopoly on the distribution of widgets. Initially, we analyze the situation in which the distributor remains free to exercise its monopoly power in distribution,
143. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 98, at 341-47. The Supreme Court majority
in Albrecht had the benefit of the nearly flawless analysis provided in Justice Harlan's dissent
showing the inefficiency of the per se rule.
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that is, the manufacturer does not establish maximum resale prices.
The demand for widgets facing the distributor is represented by D in
Figure 2, and the associated marginal revenue is represented by MR.
In order to determine the retail price and output of widgets, we have
to know the wholesale price charged to the distributor, which requires
knowing the derived demand for widgets facing the manufacturer.
Since the distributor is a natural monopolist, it will maximize its profits
by equating its marginal revenue to its marginal cost. Marginal revenue is the sum of the price charged by the producer for its widgets
(p) plus the marginal cost of distribution (MCD). In the absence of
resale prices, optimality requires that MR = p - MCD or alternatively
p = MR - MCD. Thus, the distributor will select its profit maximizing

output by equating the price it has to pay to the manufacturer (p)
with its net marginal revenue. Net marginal revenue is MR - MCD.
Consequently, when the distributor has a monopoly, the producer's
derived demand is d = MR - MCD.
The producer exploits its monopoly power by selecting the price
and output where its marginal cost (MCp) and marginal revenue (mr)
are equal. The producer will manufacture Q1 widgets for this market,
harge a price of P, per widget to the distributor, and earn profits of
(Pi - MCp)Q 1.
The distributor will have a marginal cost equal to the price it pays
to the manufacturer (pl) plus the marginal cost of distributing the
widgets (MCD). The distributor maximizes its profit by equating this

marginal cost (p, + MCD) to its marginal revenue (MR). Consequently,
the distributor will sell Q, widgets to final customers at a retail price
of P 1. The distributor now earns profits of (P 1 - (P, + MCD))Ql.
B.

Impact of Maximum Resale Prices

The distributor clearly benefits from its status as a natural
monopolist of widgets. This benefit comes at the expense of the producer and the distributor's customers. One way for the producer to
reverse this flow of benefits is to impose maximum resale prices upon
the distributor. It can enforce such a contract by terminating sales to
dealers who fail to comply and forcing them out of business.
The producer maximizes profits by preventing the distributor from
behaving like a natural monopolist. In other words, the producer wants
the distributor to behave as though it were a competitive firm. If the
distributor behaved competitively, it would operate where its marginal
cost equaled demand. Since its marginal cost is the price it pays for
the widgets (p) plus the marginal cost of distribution (MCD), the curve
labeled D - MCD would be the derived demand for the producer's
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output with competition in distribution. T4 The marginal revenue curve
for the derived demand, D - MCD, is labeled d and equals MR - MCD.
Under competitive distribution, the producer will equate its marginal
revenue, MR - MCD, to its marginal cost, MCp, and manufacture Q2
widgets in order to maximize its profit. It will charge the distributor
a wholesale price of Pi for this output, and the distributor will in turn
charge final customers a retail price of P 2 . The manufacturer's profit
in this situation is given by the area (Pi - MCp)Q2 . In contrast, the
distributor earns zero economic profit since the price it pays for the
widget plus the marginal cost of performing the distribution function
equals the retail price, (Pl + MCD = P 2 ).
The identical outcome can be achieved by setting maximum resale
prices. In Figure 2, if the producer establishes a maximum resale
price of P 2 , the distributor's marginal revenue curve becomes equal
to P 2 for all outputs between zero and Q2 . For outputs greater than
Q2, the distributor's marginal revenue curve drops to MR. Thus, a
maximum resale price of P 2 will prevent the distributor from restricting output below Q2 because the distributor's marginal cost will equal
the effective marginal revenue at Q2 units of output. Fixing maximum
resale prices yields the price and quantity that would result from
competition at the distribution stage. For the retail customer, price
is lower and a larger quantity is consumed when the manufacturer
sets maximum resale prices. This, of course, benefits the consumer.
In addition, maximum resale prices increase the manufacturer's profits
to the level that would be realized if the distribution stage were
competitive. The manufacturer is motivated by this increased profit,
and not by some concern for the welfare of the retail customers.
Nonetheless, the producer's imposition of maximum resale prices enhances consumer welfare.
Maximum resale price fixing is invariably used by a supplier to
prevent distributors from exploiting their market power. In KieferStewart, ostensible horizontal competitors in wholesale distribution
were allegedly fixing minimum prices. The wholesalers were conspiring to raise prices. The concerted action of Seagram and Calvert may
prevent the inevitable decline in sales that accompanies an increase
in price. Although wholesale distributors alone may have had little
monopoly power, collectively they were trying to emulate the price

144. Competitive behavior would result in D = p + MCD. Thus, the manufacturer faces
a derived demand of p = D - MCD.
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and output that a monopolist would select. Fixing maximum prices
thwarts these intentions of horizontal price fixers at the distribution
stage.
C.

Inefficiency of the Albrecht Rule

By prohibiting maximum resale price fixing, the Albrecht rule permits a restriction of output from Q2 to Q1 and an increase in the retail
price from P 2 to P 1. At the price and output of P 2 and Q2, respectively,
total profit - all of which goes to the producer - equals (P 2 - (MCp
+ MCD))Q 2 . When the distributor raises the retail price to P1 , it
increases its profits from zero to (P1 - P 2 )Q1. At the same time, the
producer's profits fall by more than the increase in the distributor's
profits. 145 Thus, the total profits with the Albrecht rule are lower than
they would be if maximum price fixing were allowed. The reduction
in the total profits earned is a measure of the inefficiency of the
Albrecht rule. This inefficiency provides an incentive for litigation. 146
D. Litigation v. Settlement of Albrecht Rule Cases
Since the Albrecht rule is inefficient, the evolutionary models
suggest that upstream firms may be interested in pursuing a change
in the rule through repeated litigation. 14
' But engaging in litigation is
a risky activity that can be avoided by settlement. Whether settlement
is more likely than litigation depends upon the expected costs and
benefits of litigation to the parties.
When an upstream firm imposes maximum resale prices on a downstream firm, it prevents that downstream firm from earning excess
profits. Accordingly, the downstream firm will be suing for three times

145.

The decrease in the producer's profits equals (P2

- (MCp +

MCD))(Q2 - Q,). In Figure

2, (Q2 - Qj) = Q1. Thus, the producer loses profits of (P2 - (MCp + MCD))Ql. Figure 2 shows that
(PI - P2 )Qj is less than (P2 - (MCp + MCD))Q1. A more rigorous proof is provided in R. BLAIR
& D. KASERmAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 33-35
(1988).
146. The Albrecht rule also imposes social welfare losses. When the distributor raises the
home delivered price to P1, it imposes a deadweight social welfare loss of ( )(PI - Pz)(Q 2 - Q,).
Thus, the Albrecht rule prohibits a pricing strategy that would prevent a reduction in social
welfare. On these grounds, the Albrecht rule is socially inefficient.

147. The rule against fixing maximum prices persists. Although the practice may occur in
any situation where successive market power exists, most of the recent cases involve newspaper
distribution, as in Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977), or
gasoline dealers as in Yentsch v. Texaco, 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980). In these cases, the lower
courts have endorsed the unambiguous holding of the Supreme Court. Consequently, the vitality
of the rule enunciated in Albrecht continues despite its questionable economic logic.
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the profits denied by the maximum resale price fixing (rD), plus its
costs of litigation (CD).14 If the upstream firm wins, it will still have
to pay its own costs of litigation (Cu), but it will avoid a continued
reduction in its profits.14 This reduction is some multiple of the downstream firm's profits: brD where b > 1. Thus, the upstream firm
stands to lose three times rD plus CD . If it goes to trial and wins, it
will save the present value of the profit reduction (PV(brD)). Since
the upstream firm must pay its own litigation costs in any event, the
expected value of litigation to the upstream firm is
E[L]u = P[- 3 rD - CD - Cu)] + (1-P) [-Cu + PV(brD)]
where P is the probability of the downstream firm's winning, and
(1-P) is the probability of the upstream firm's winning.
If the downstream firm sues and wins, it will recover three times
the excess profit denied by the maximum resale price fixing. If it
loses, it will have to pay its own cost of litigation' 5° and give up rD
in the future. Consequently, the expected value of litigation for the
downstream firm is
E[L]D = P[3 rD] + (1-P) [-PV(rD) - CD]
The condition for litigation can be found by comparing the expected
gains and losses of going to court. One expects a case to be litigated
if the expected loss to the upstream firm is less than the expected

gain to the downstream firm, that is, if -E[L]u < E[L]D:
P[ 3 rD + CD + Cu] - (1-P) [ Cu + PV(brD)] <
P[3rD] + (1-P) [-CD - PV(rD)]
After some algebraic rearrangement, one finds that a maximum price
fixing case will be litigated in an effort to overturn the Albrecht rule if
(l-P)IPV(brD) - PV(rD)] > CD + Cu

148. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1980).
149. Assume now that the upstream firm has only two options: to engage in maximum
price fixing or not to engage in it.
150. This abstracts from the usual practice of the plaintiffs having a contingent fee arrangement with an attorney.
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In this condition for litigation, PV(brD) - PV(rD) is a measure of the
inefficiency of the Albrecht rule, while (1-P) is the probability of the
upstream firm's winning the suit. Thus, the upstream firm will litigate
the inefficient Albrecht rule if the probability of its winning times the
inefficiency of the rule exceeds the sum of the litigation costs. Otherwise, the dispute will be settled.
We have seen that fixing maximum resale prices is illegal per se
and, as a result, precedent strongly favors the downstream firm. This
suggests that (l-P) is relatively small although it is still positive. For
b > 1, the second bracketed term is positive and, therefore, the
left-hand side is positive although it may be quite small. Since the
sum of the litigation costs is necessarily positive, and may be quite
substantial in antitrust cases, the condition for litigation may not be
satisfied. In fact, this appears to be the case because there are very
few maximum price fixing cases actually litigated. Only two cases
have reached the Supreme Court: Kiefer-Stewart in 1951 and Albrecht
in 1968.151 Moreover, very few lower court cases have been tried.1 2
Since the Albrecht rule is inefficient, this is an unfortunate result
because the evolutionary process cannot operate to reverse the inefficienty.

One reason that there may not be much future litigation is that
plaintiffs may experience serious difficulty in proving damages. For
example, the court in Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crutb'6
acknowledged "the clear precedent of Albrecht and its progeny,"154
which made maximum vertical price fixing a per se violation. But it
found that Crumb could not prove damages because competitive forces
in the market compelled distributors to hold down prices. S The competitive force that the court referred to was a termination clause in
the distributors' contracts.15 6 The court characterized the clause as "a
legal, competitive market force" that restrained their pricing freedom.157 As long as a distributor is aware that its franchise will be

151. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), also dealt with fixing
maximum prices, but it involved a horizontal agreement. The motivation and analysis is quite
different. See Harrison, Price Fixing, the Professions, and Ancillary Restraints:Coping With
Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 925.
152. The few that have been tried usually involve gasoline and newspaper distribution. See
supra note 147.
153. Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1985).

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 475.
at 476.
at 477.
at 476.
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terminated if it exceeds certain prices, the distributor will be unable
to prove that damages flowed from the Albrecht violation rather than
from the manufacturer's legal right to terminate a distributor. 15
VI.

ALTERNATIVES TO FIXING MAXIMUM PRICES

Inefficiency develops because the downstream firm does not simply
receive a piece of the upstream firm's profit: total profits also decline.
The value of brD provides some measure of the incentive that the
upstream firm has to remove the inefficiency. Fixing maximum resale
prices is not a sensible option given the extreme hostility of the Albrecht rule. Thus, firms may search for alternatives and, fortunately,
alternatives exist. Many of these alternatives are quite safe from antitrust attack in spite of the fact that they yield results that are economically equivalent to resale price fixing. Several of these alternatives
are considered.
A.

Vertical Integration

In our patented widget hypothetical, the producer could vertically
integrate and distribute its widgets through its own employees. This
would provide results economically equivalent to the results achieved
by fixing maximum prices. Following vertical integration, the producer-distributor would produce and distribute Q2 widgets where marginal cost (MCp + MCD) equals marginal revenue (MR). The retail
price would be P2 , and the firm's profits would be (P2 - MCP - MCD)Q 2.
This strategy would appear to be reasonably safe from antitrust challenge. 159
B.

Performance Standards

The producer may insist upon an adequate performance by its
distributor as a substitute for vertical price fixing. Based upon its
knowledge of demand and cost conditions, the manufacturer may require that its distributor sell Q2 widgets. There is only one way that
the distributor can sell Q2 widgets and that is to reduce the price
from P1 to P2 . Thus, controlling quantity is equivalent to controlling
price and the profits are clearly the same. Apparently, no cases render
performance standards illegal.

158. Id.
159. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 729.7 (Supp. 1982), surveys several newspaper cases
in which independent distributors were eliminated through vertical integration. See also Paschall
v. Kansas City Star, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984). See
generally P. AREEDA &D. TURNER, 4 ANTITRUST LAW 296-319 (1980) (survey of 43 cases).
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Dual Distribution

A third option is to engage in dual distribution. In this instance,
the manufacturer would offer to serve any customer at a retail price
of P2 . This would make it impossible for the independent distributor
to charge a price in excess of P2 because the customer could always
turn to the producer to get a lower price. To the extent that this
effectively deters the distributor from charging more than P2 , dual
distribution will act precisely the same as fixing maximum resale
prices. 16° Dual distribution does not appear to violate the antitrust
laws unless some predatory squeeze occurs.161
A recent case deserves consideration. In Jack Walters & Sons,
Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc.,'162 the plaintiff, Walters, was a building

materials distributor and the defendant, Morton, was a manufacturer
of prefabricated farm buildings. 16 Morton sometimes advertised retail
prices directly to the ultimate customer.'6 In order to maintain the
credibility of its advertising claims, Morton had to be sure that Walters
as well as other dealers respected those prices.'6 Walters complained
that this constituted an Albrecht violation.'6 Judge Posner found that
"even if Morton did violate the prohibition against fixing its dealers'
prices, the only harm to Walters came from the fact that competing
dealers (or Morton itself) would lower their prices to consumers if
Walters did not."167 Thus, imposing price discipline through dual dis-

tribution received judicial approval.
There are at least three alternatives to fixing maximum resale
prices that provide equivalent economic results without exposing the
upstream firm to antitrust liability. As a consequence, the potential
for litigation that could reverse the unfortunate precedent of Albrecht
is even less likely than the preceding section would imply. There is
no reason for an upstream firm to contest a per se rule when a reasonably safe alternative exists.

160. Dual distribution, however, is a cumbersome way of dealing with the successive
monopoly problem, especially if the manufacturer actually has to serve many customers.
161.

For a brief analysis, see P. AREEDA & D.

TURNER,

3 ANTITRUST LAW

728 (1978).

162. Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
163. Id. at 701.
164. Id. at 707.

165. Id. at 708.
166. Walters also alleged that Morton illegally tied its trademark to the sale of its building
material packages, engaged in predatory acts to assume the distribution function, and owed
Walters a duty of good faith. Id. at 701.
167.

Id. at 709.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

According to the evolutionary models of the common law, 1' inefficient rules of law will tend to be litigated while efficient rules will
not. As a result, the common law efficiency that Judge Posner observed 69 was due to the pursuit of individual self-interest. This article
sought to determine whether the evolutionary models of the common
law could be applied fruitfully to the Sherman Act.1 70 The evolution
of the per se rule against horizontal price fixing and its variants were
examined. This rule is economically efficient and is not challenged as
would be expected according to the evolutionary theory. 71 The economically inefficient rule against vertically fixing maximum resale prices,
the Albrecht rule, was also examined. Since this rule is inefficient, it
imposes deadweight welfare losses upon the upstream firm. The upstream firm has more to gain than the downstream firm has to lose
by a change to an efficient rule. Accordingly, the evolutionary theory
predicts continued litigation of the Albrecht rule.
For several reasons the Albrecht rule is not frequently litigated.
First, there are alternatives that are both less hazardous legally and
provide economically equivalent results. 72 The asymmetry in the legal
treatment of these economically equivalent alternatives encourages
firms to use relatively inefficient business strategies. This, in turn,
increases the upstream firm's costs, but it increases them by less than
the expected costs of challenging the existing precedent. This is a
very general point that should not be overlooked. Whenever alternative strategies exist, the firm must consider the relative costs of adopting a safer, although higher cost strategy, in lieu of litigating to alter
a precedent. In the case of horizontal price fixing, safer alternatives
are hard to find. But in the case of the vertical price fixing, safer
alternatives exist which may well involve higher costs.

168. See supra notes 6-7 & 12; see also supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
169. R. POSNER, supra note 2.
170. See supranotes 3747 and accompanying text. Since the vague language of the Sherman

Act required common law interpretation and development, one would expect these models to
be useful.
171. The prevalence of suits reflects the fact that some subtleties are still to be resolved.
See Catalano v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643 (1980); United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Private and public

remedies appear inadequate to deter price fixing. For contrasting views on deterrence compare
Blair, A Suggestion for Improved Antitrust Enforcement, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 433 (1985)
with Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 652 (1983).
172. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
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